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RECENT DECISIONS

WAR-EERGENCY PRICE CONTROL-SUIT FOR TREBLE DAMAGES FOR SALE IN EXCESS OF MAXIMUM

CEILING

PRICE.-Suit

for treble damages was brought based on the allegation that the
defendant "agreed, offered, and attempted to sell and deliver to plaintiff" a certain automobile at a price in excess of the maximum established under the regulations adopted by the Office of Price Administration under the authority of the Emergency Price Control Act of
1942.1 Plaintiff sought to recover three times the sum in excess of
the maximum at which defendant "agreed, offered, and attempted to
sell and deliver" the automobile to plaintiff, but there was no allegation in the complaint that plaintiff actually paid anything to defendant. Defendant made a motion to dismiss the complaint for insufficiency on its face. Held, motion granted. Congress intended
the recovery of treble damages to apply only when a price in excess
of the maximum was actually paid by the consumer, not bargained
for. The failure of the complainant to allege the payment of the
above-ceiling price was fatal to her suit. Lowres v. Fergus Motors,
Inc., 5 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 478 (1944).
Since the Emergency Price Control Act is constitutional solely
because it is a wartime emergency measure, 2 it must be construed
in such manner as fulfills the purpose of the Congress as disclosed
bv the literal meaning of the words of the statute.3 In other words,
the punitive feature of this section authorizing a person who has
been overcharged in violation of price regulation to bring action for
$50 or for treble the overcharge must be strictly construed and cannot be operative against a defendant unless this section expressly
authorizes it, and liability cannot be established or extended by implication. 4 Going a step further, the court, in a case which gained
nationwide notoriety due to the concomitant use of troops to seize
and occupy the premises of the company, said, "The statute is not
to be administered grudgingly, and requires a strict construction of
all violative acts." 5
1Act Jan. 30, 1942, c. 26, 56 STAT. 23, 50 U. S. C. A. § 901 et seq.
2 Yakus v. United States, 64 Sup. Ct 660, 321 U. S. 414, 88 L. ed. 834
(1944) ; Rottenberg v. United States, 137 F. (2d) 850, aff'd, 64 Sup. Ct. 660,
321 U. S. 414, 88 L. ed. 834 (1943); accord, Taylor v. United States, 142
F. (2d) 808 (1944) ; Brown v. W. T. Grant Co., 53 F. Supp. 182 (1943).
3 Bowles v. Chew, 53 F. Supp. 787; Bowles v. Strickland, 55 F. Supp. 132
(1944); Ward v. Bochino, 181 Misc. 355, 46 N. Y. S. (2d) 54 (1944) ; accord,
Bristol v. Sun Vacuum Stores, 181 Misc. 522, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 501 (1943)
Kerr v. Congel, 181 Misc. 461, 46 N. Y. S. (2d) 932 (1944).
4 Hall v. Chaltis, 31 A. (2d) 699 (1943); accord, Ward v. Bochino, 181
Misc. 355, 46 N. Y. S. (2d) 54 (1944) ; Lightbody v. Russell, 45 N. Y. S. (2d)
15 (1944).
5 Bowles v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 143 F. (2d) 38 (1943).
The words
quoted were cited with approval by the U. S. Supreme Court in Hecht v.
Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 64 Sup. Ct. 587 (1944).
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The section of the statute upon which the plaintiff sued in the
instant case (50 U. S. C. A. § 925 [e] ) reads: "If any person selling
a commodity violates a regulation, order, or price schedule prescribing a maximum price, the person who buys such commodity for use
or consumption may bring an action either for $50 or for treble the
amount by which the consideration exceeded the applicable maximum
price, whichever is the greater." A clue as to the meaning of the
word "buy" as intended by the Congress can be seen in the sentence
of the section next succeeding 6 the one quoted. That sentence reads
as follows: "For the purposes of this section the payment or receipt
of rent for defense-area housing accommodations shall be deemed the
buying or selling of a commodity, as the case may be." 7 The court,
in granting the defendant's motion to dismiss, relied heavily upon
this sentence of the statute just quoted. It was forced to do so
because the legal definitions help the plaintiff. The word "buy" in a
legal sense means: "to acquire the ownership of property by giving
an accepted price or consideration therefor; or by agreeing to do
88o."
Thus

an accepted promise to pay a certain sum for an article

of goods comprises a buying of those goods, without the actual tender
of the money.
The decision in the instant case was one of many in which the
statute was construed in an exceedingly strict manner. In an effort
to discourage the courts from rendering the statute powerless to fulfill its worthy task, Douglas, J. of the U. S. Supreme Court, skillftlly warned that "the Administrator does not carry the sole burden
rf the war against inflation. The courts also have been entrusted
with a share of that responsibility. And their discretion under Section 205 must be exercised in the light of the large objectives of
the Act. For the standards of the public interest, not the requirements of private litigation, measure the propriety and need for relief
in these cases. That discretion should reflect an acute awareness of
the Congressional admonition that 'of all the consequences of war,
except human slaughter, inflation is the most destructive' (S. Rep.
No. 931) and that delay or indifference may be fatal." 9
650 U. S. C. A. §925(f).
7 Italics supplied.

8 BLAcx's LAW DICTIONARY.
Following through on legal definitions, a "sale" is defined by modern
authorities as "a contract or agreement for transfer of the absolute property
in personalty from one person to another for a price in money." TIEDEMAN,
SALES § 1, taken from 2 KENT'S COmm. 468. This definition does not accord
with the older meaning given by Blackstone, who defined a sale to be "a transmutation of property from one man to another in consideration of some price."
2 BL. CoMM. 446. The former, more widely accepted definition, allows an
executory arrangement for the transfer of property to constitute a sale.
9Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S.321, 64 Sup. Ct. 587 (1944).
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With the end of the war in Europe there will be a tendency for
people, particularly discharged servicemen, to forget the warnings
about the rising cost of living. Vast sums of ready cash, accumulated
during the war, will be ready to snatch up the newly manufactured
products as they commence to roll off the production lines. The
strain on the maximum price-ceilings, great as it is now, will multiply enormously. Demand will overwhelm supply, and all sorts of
inachinations will be attempted to escape the ceiling prices by buyer
and seller alike. The courts must prepare now for the stress to
come. The Emergency Price Control Act must not be allowed to
become a weaponless mass of verbiage, it must be forged into an
effective means capable of holding back the flood. The tendency
c.f the courts must be away from the rule of construction applied in
the instant case, and more in line with the warning of Mr. Justice
Douglas.
S. P.

